





Brain over Brawn: Shared Beliefs and Presumptions
in Chinese and Western Strategemata
Que l’esprit dépasse la force : des présupposés communs aux traditions chinoise









Presses universitaires de Vincennes
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 November 2014





David A. Graff, « Brain over Brawn: Shared Beliefs and Presumptions in Chinese and Western 
Strategemata », Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident [Online], 38 | 2014, Online since 01 January 2017,
connection on 28 November 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/extremeorient/371  ; DOI :
10.4000/extremeorient.371 
© PUV
Brain over Brawn: Shared Beliefs and Presumptions  
in Chinese and Western Strategemata
David A. Graff
The claim has often been made that there is a unique and distinctive 
“Western Way of War” that differs fundamentally from the military thought 
and practice of China and other non-Western cultures. This view, especially 
prevalent in the United States military in recent years, is mirrored by the claims 
of Chinese military intellectuals regarding the uniqueness (and superiority) of 
their own country’s ancient tradition of strategic thought. 1
This article addresses a single aspect of this much larger problem by 
comparing the West’s classical tradition of strategemata with the corresponding 
Chinese tradition. Proponents of the “Western Way of War” have drawn a sharp 
contrast between a direct, straightforward Western approach and an “Oriental” 
way of war characterized by evasion and trickery. 2 This contrast is supported 
by the facile juxtaposition of Sunzi’s famous dictum that “Warfare is a way 
of deception” with Carl von Clausewitz’s brusque dismissal of the utility of 
cunning in war: “To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to 
impress an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and 
the costs increase with the scale of the deception. Normally they call for more 
than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have the 
desired effect.” 3 Yet Clausewitz, writing a mere two hundred years ago, is not 
necessarily the best spokesman for a military tradition putatively covering 
1. With regard to the US, see Porter (2009): 17 sq. In the academic year 2008-2009, the 
Command and General Staff Officers Course at Fort Leavenworth included a curricular 
“block” entitled “Rise of the Western Way of War,” with Geoffrey Parker’s Cambridge 
History of Warfare – which embraces the WWW concept – as one of its core readings. 
Many other examples could easily be added. For the Chinese side, see Sawyer (2007): 
328-331, and Peng and Yao (eds.) (2005): 87-93, 128.
2. Hanson (1990): 222-228; Keegan (1993): 202, 221, 244, 332-333, 387-388.
3. Clausewitz (1984): 203.
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more than twenty-five centuries, nor is he the most apt comparison with a 
Chinese thinker of much greater antiquity.
Eschewing the apples-to-oranges comparison of Sunzi and Clausewitz, 
this article examines ancient and early medieval writings that directly address 
the application of cunning in war. From the Western side, the objects of 
analysis are the classical compendia of Frontinus, Onasander, and Polyaenus 
– all dating from the first two centuries of the Common Era – and the later 
Byzantine military treatises, especially the Strategikon dating from circa 600 
CE and conventionally attributed to the emperor Maurikios. On the Chinese 
side, attention is directed to the ancient military treatises (of which Sunzi 
bingfa is the best known), the early dynastic histories, and Du You’s Tong 
dian, an important encyclopedia dating from the late eighth century CE. It 
will be seen that for all practical intents and purposes the two corpora form 
a single corpus – that is, they include essentially the same range of cunning 
stratagems that appear to derive from common or shared assumptions about 
human psychology.
Traditions of cunning
In both the Chinese and the Greco-Byzantine traditions, the ideal was to 
employ strategy and cunning to defeat the enemy without having to fight a 
battle. One of the most famous passages in Sunzi bingfa, the assertion that the 
acme of skill is not victory in battle but rather to subdue the enemy without 
fighting, has a parallel in the Strategikon: “Strategy makes use of times and 
places, surprises and various tricks to outwit the enemy with the idea of 
achieving its objectives even without actual fighting.” 4 In this regard, the 
Byzantine text is also in keeping with the earlier Greek literature on the art of 
war, which sought “to avoid the risks of battle except under the most favorable 
circumstances, and to use every conceivable nonmilitary device to improve 
the likelihood of accomplishing one’s purposes with the minimum of losses.” 5
The valorization of cunning, of the use of one’s wits and tongue and to 
achieve one’s aims, had a venerable pedigree in the Greek cultural traditions 
inherited by Byzantium, reaching back as far as the wily Odysseus in the 
Illiad and the Odyssey. The Greeks called the form of cunning intelligence 
exemplified by the inventor of the Trojan horse metis. According to Lisa 
Raphals, “This mode of intelligence embraces a set of skills and mental attitudes 
4. Dennis (1984): 23; Mair (2007): 85; Guo (ed.) (1962): 34.
5. Kaegi (1983): 12.
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that range from wisdom, forethought, keen attention, and resourcefulness to 
subtle indirection, craft, deception, and cunning. It relies on skill, strategy, 
and a general knack for handling whatever comes along.” 6 What Raphals 
has called “metic intelligence” was often put to work in early Greek warfare. 
One classicist has counted more than 140 examples of trickery and deception 
ranging from the eighth century to the fourth century BCE. 7 To pick only one 
example, at the battle of Sepeia early in the fifth century BCE, Kleomenes 
of Sparta surprised and defeated the Argives after pretending to disband his 
troops for breakfast, with the result that a reported 6,000 Argives were slain. 
Another modern scholar has found that ambushes, night raids, and attacks on 
camps were quite common in Greek warfare: “An appreciation of cunning 
was as much a constant factor as admiration for fair and open combat.” And 
in ancient times no less an authority than Xenophon asserted, in his Cavalry 
Commander, that “in war nothing is more profitable than deceit.” 8 The Romans 
sometimes professed to disdain the Greek emphasis on cleverness in war, but 
their actual behavior tended to conform to the precedents set by the Greeks. 9 As 
for the Byzantines, the Strategikon maintains that deception “is often helpful in 
warfare” and offers various means of misleading the enemy; in order to retreat 
safely, for example, one should “build a fire in one place and quietly go off to 
another; the enemy will head for the fire.” And one should not allow oneself 
to be deceived by the enemy’s humane acts, by his pretending to retreat, or by 
false reports brought by his deserters. 10
The observations of classicist Everett L. Wheeler that the ancient Greeks 
“seem to expect trickery and to take delight in it” and believed that “one should 
be prepared for it and able to deceive a deceiver” may be applied with equal 
force to the ancient Chinese – if not to straitlaced Confucian scholars, then 
certainly to the authors of military texts and works on rhetoric and persuasion, 
as well as a great many practical politicians and statesmen. 11Sunzi bingfa 
pronounces unequivocally that “Warfare is a way of deception” and offers 
a variety of specific suggestions for misleading the enemy. 12 Other classical 
military texts such as the Liu tao also place great emphasis on deceit, and the 
6. Raphals (1992): xi-xii. The discussion of metis in Jullien (2004): 8 is also helpful.
7. Krentz (Wees) (2000): 183-199.
8. Wees (2004): 131, 133.
9. Wheeler (1988): 16, 24, 102, and 110.
10. Dennis (1984): 80-83, 89.
11. Wheeler (1988): 108-109, and Raphals (1992): 7, 101. Raphals notes that the Chinese 
military texts stress “metic intelligence” (p. 103). Even the Confucian scholar Mencius 
is reported to have practiced deception on some occasions.
12. Mair (2007): 78; Guo (ed.) (1962): 12.
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Zhanguoce, a collection of stories about the politico-military skullduggery of 
the Warring States collected in the Western Han period, presents hundreds of 
cunning and elaborate stratagems for its readers’ delectation. 13 In the historical 
literature from the Zuo zhuan and the Shiji onward, battle narratives typically 
focus on elaborate stratagems while neglecting the more mundane aspects of 
combat and maneuver. For example, one account of the battle fought between 
the rival warlords Li Mi and Wang Shichong in the Mang Hills northeast of 
Luoyang in the autumn of 618 CE tells us that outcome was decided by a ploy 
of Wang’s. At the height of the action, he had a man in his own army who 
resembled Li Mi trussed up and brought out, and then raised the cry that his 
opponent had been captured – causing a panic in Li Mi’s army. 14 On another 
occasion a few years later, the Tang general Chai Shao is supposed to have 
distracted his Tangut and Tuyuhun foes by having two girls dance to musical 
accompaniment while his cavalry circled around to their rear. This sort of 
thing is commonplace in traditional Chinese battle narratives; though it may 
not have loomed quite so large in the actual warfare of the time, it does tells us 
something about cultural ideals and what educated, literate men thought war 
ought to be like.
Shared stratagems
“Stratagem” has been defined by Wheeler as “a strategic or tactical act 
of trickery, deceit, or cunning in military affairs especially war, whereby 
one attempts to gain psychological or material advantage over an opponent, 
to neutralize some part of an opponent’s superiority, to minimize one’s own 
expenditure of resources, or to restore the morale and physical state of one’s 
own forces.” 15 The Greco-Roman-Byzantine textual tradition includes a great 
many specific examples of such devices, some of them gathered in collections 
of strategemata such as those of Frontinus and Polyaenus, others appearing in 
military manuals and historical works. In general, there is both a high degree 
of continuity within this tradition and a very high level of congruence with the 
13. See, for example, the “Wen fa” chapter of Liu tao, in Xu (ed.) (1986): 88-90, and 
Sawyer (1993): 56 sq. Also, Crump (1996).
14. Ouyang, Song (1975): 3684. The original source for this anecdote is probably the 
now lost Huguan lu; see Sima Guang’s comments in Zizhi tongjian: Sima Guang 
(1956): 5811. As I discuss in detail in Graff (1995): 307-312, there are both textual and 
practical reasons for doubting the authenticity of this story.
15. Wheeler (1988): x sq.
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Chinese textual tradition which is itself marked by continuity. Not only do we 
find the same emphasis on deception and the exploitation of psychology to 
achieve one’s aims, but we also find the same schemes and devices employed 
at both ends of the Eurasian landmass. Both the “Military Methods” of the early 
Tang general Li Jing (preserved in Du You’s Tong dian) and an anonymous 
Byzantine text probably dating from the ninth century recommend that if 
one must fight a battle when one is weaker than the enemy, it is best to start 
the battle near sunset so that darkness will impede pursuit in the event of a 
defeat. 16 Li Jing, Onasander, and the author of the Strategikon were all aware 
that at night campfires could be manipulated to deceive the enemy as to one’s 
whereabouts and intentions. 17 Western and Chinese texts are both familiar with 
the idea of distracting the enemy with a feint or demonstration, something 
that could be done at either the tactical or strategic level. In China the idea 
first appears in Sunzi bingfa and in the Tang dynasty is given the following 
formulation by Du You: “Announce that you will strike in the east, but actually 
strike in the west.” 18 In the Western tradition, Polyaenus reports that on one 
occasion the fourth-century BCE Athenian general Iphicrates was able to pass 
an enemy position safely at night by blowing his trumpets at one end of the 
line and then marching quietly past at the other end. 19 He also recounts how 
another Athenian general, Demosthenes, took Pylos during the Peloponnesian 
War. Finding the place too strongly garrisoned by the Spartans, Demosthenes 
feinted against Acra – and when the Spartans marched off to defend that place, 
he returned to capture Pylos. 20 This is a close fit with the classic Chinese 
stratagem of “besieging Wei to rescue Zhao” (wei Wei jiu Zhao), defined as 
subduing “the enemy indirectly by threatening one of his unprotected weak 
spots,” which makes its first appearance in Sima Qian’s Shiji biography of Sun 
Bin in connection with a campaign involving the states of Qi, Wei, and Zhao in 
the mid-fourth century BCE. 21 The distractions could sometimes be elaborate 
16. Du (1988): 3840 sq.; “Anonymous Byzantine” in Dennis (1985): 105, which spells out 
the logic more fully than the Chinese text.
17. Du (1988): 3840 sq.; Illinois Greek Club (1923): 419; Dennis (1984): 81. The Chinese 
use of campfires to delude the enemy reaches back at least as far as the Maling 
campaign of 341 BCE, as described in Sima Qian’s Shiji biography of the strategist 
Sun Bin. See Sima Qian (1959): 2164, translated in Nienhauser (ed.) (1995): 41.
18. Senger (1991): 75-77; Mair (2207): 96 sq.; Du (1988): 3914.
19. Polyaenus (1974): 102.
20. Polyaenus (1974): 95 sq.
21. Senger (1991): 33-37. Sun Bin was seeking to relieve Wei’s siege of the Zhao capital 
(not capture it himself) by striking at Wei’s own capital, and in this case the pithy four-
character expression was not coined until the Ming dynasty, in Luo Guanzhong’s novel 
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and even outrageous. On one occasion in 193 BCE, in an episode recorded by 
Frontinus that is reminiscent of Chai Shao’s use of dancing girls against the 
Tangut and Tuyuhun eight hundred years later, Rome’s auxiliary Numidian 
cavalry pretended to fall from their horses and “engage in ridiculous antics” 
to throw their Ligurian opponents off guard. The Ligurians, “breaking ranks at 
the novel sight, gave themselves up completely to the enjoyment of the show,” 
with the result that the Numidians were able to break through their line. 22
In both the Chinese and Greco-Roman-Byzantine traditions, military men 
are told to be alert to the enemy’s wiles and are even given specific tips that 
might alert them to attempts at deception. Frontinus tells us that when fighting 
the Etruscans around 280 BCE, Q. Aemilius Paulus “saw afar off a flock of 
birds rise in somewhat startled flight from a forest, and realized that some 
treachery was lurking there, both because the birds had risen in alarm and at 
the same time in great numbers.” Sure enough, his scouts found ten thousand 
enemy soldiers lying in ambush there. Polyaenus records a Greek example of 
the same thing, and this, too, is repeated by Frontinus. 23 On the Chinese side, 
Sunzi bingfa (ch. 9) warns us, “when birds fly up, there is an ambush.” 24
Many stratagems were based on assumptions about human behavior 
and what we would today call mass psychology: when confronted with 
a stimulus X, men will respond by doing Y. In both East and West, these 
assumptions – and the stratagems derived from them – were essentially the 
same. Wang Shichong’s ploy involving the man who resembled Li Mi has a 
close, if not exact, counterpart in the pages of Onasander: “…when the leader 
of the enemy is some distance away either on one wing or holding the centre, 
[the general] should call out, ‘The general of the enemy had been killed,’ or 
‘the king,’ or whoever it may be.” This, we are assured, will encourage one’s 
own troops and cause the enemy soldiers to lose heart and perhaps even flee 
in panic. 25 Frontinus recounts that in 280 BCE the Roman general Valerius 
Laevinus spread a false rumor that he had slain his opponent, Pyrrhus of Epirus. 
Pyrrhus’ men were “panic-stricken at the falsehood, and thinking that they had 
been rendered helpless by the death of their commander, betook themselves in 
San guo yanyi. The original story can be found in Sima Qian (1959): 2163, translated 
in Nienhauser (ed.) (1995): 40.
22. Frontinus (1980): 45.
23. Frontinus (1980): 21, 23; Polyaenus (1974): 92.
24. Mair (2007): 110; Guo (ed.) (1962): 153.
25. Illinois Greek Club (1923): 463.
Brain over Brawn
53
terror back to camp.” 26 This ploy would have been even more effective during 
the medieval period, when armies were often held together by personal bonds 
between leaders and followers and the sight of a leader’s death was almost 
always sufficient to precipitate an immediate rout. 27
Psychological manipulation
In both China and the Mediterranean world, there was an understanding 
that morale was highly situational, that what soldiers could (and could not) 
be expected to do depended very much on the location and the context. Both 
Sunzi bingfa and the Strategikon make the point that soldiers deep in enemy 
territory will fight with more determination than in their own homeland, with 
the Byzantine manual spelling out the psychological assumptions left implicit 
by Sunzi: men will fight more aggressively when their personal safety depends 
on success in fighting, and where there are no friendly strongholds to offer 
them refuge. 28 Similarly, the ancient Chinese military classic, the Strategikon, 
and the tenth-century Byzantine treatise “On Skirmishing” agree that the best 
time to attack an invading army is on its return road, when it is laden down with 
booty and its soldiers are already thinking of home and thus psychologically 
unprepared for further combat. 29 In general, it was always and everywhere 
considered advisable to confront an exhausted enemy with troops who were 
fresh and well rested. 30
In both traditions, the soldiers were to be manipulated rather than exhorted. 
The author of the Strategikon advises the general not to share his plans with his 
26. Frontinus (1980): 129. Polyaenus has a similar stratagem aimed at the same effect, 
with the Athenian general Myronides shouting on the right wing that the left has been 
victorious, encouraging his own men and demoralizing the Thebans opposing them. 
See Polyaenus (1974): 32.
27. McGeer (1995): 307 sq. McGeer is speaking of the Byzantines and their opponents, but 
the general point can be extended to many Chinese armies—especially those involved 
in civil conflicts such as that which surrounded the Sui-Tang transition.
28. Dennis (1984): 83; Mair (2007): 117 sq.; Guo (ed.) (1962): 181-189.
29. Dennis (1984): 107 sq.; Dennis (1985): 157-159; Mair (2007): 103—but note that the 
Chinese treatise appears to offer contradictory advice since one is not supposed to 
intercept an army returning home (page 104). For Chinese text, see Guo (ed.) (1962): 
119-131.




troops, a point already made a millennium or so earlier in the Sunzi bingfa. 31 
In both China and the ancient Mediterranean world auspices and omens were 
taken very seriously by military writers, not as guides to action but rather as 
powerful influences on the soldiers’ morale. The approach recommended by 
the most influential of the Chinese military manuals was to ban unofficial 
prognostication that might give rise to doubts among the troops. In a famous 
passage, Sunzi bingfa advises the general to “prohibit talk of omens and 
banish doubts,” advice that was echoed and expanded upon by Li Jing in 
the Tang: “If one speaks of Dao or Buddha, or prays to ghosts and spirits, 
or performs divination with yin and yang, or spreads false talk of auspicious 
and inauspicious omens, thereby shaking the morale of the masses, execute 
him and those who run back and forth to carry on conversations with him.” 32 
Some Western commanders would have agreed; campaigning in Spain in 134 
BCE, the Roman Scipio Aemilianus expelled all the soothsayers from his camp 
(along with traders and prostitutes) in order to restore discipline. 33 In general, 
however, the Greco-Roman tradition tended to take a more positive approach, 
advising the use of favorable omens to raise the spirits of the troops. According 
to Onasander, “The general should neither lead his army on a journey, nor 
marshal it for battle, without first making a sacrifice; in fact, official sacrifices 
and diviners should accompany him.” Nothing should be undertaken until the 
omens are favorable, for soldiers “are far more courageous when they believe 
they are facing dangers with the good will of the gods…” 34
This is taken a step further by Frontinus and Polyaenus, who present – 
with evident approval – numerous historical instances of favorable omens 
deliberately faked. The fourth-century BCE Theban general Epaminondas, for 
example, had his troops make vows at the temple of Hercules after he had 
secretly arranged for the priests to polish some rusty arms and place them 
beside the god’s statue. Taken to be a sign of supernatural assistance, this 
greatly increased morale and the Thebans went on to defeat the Spartans. 35 
The historical sources make it quite clear that some Chinese generals also 
saw the advantage in this approach, whatever Sunzi might say to the contrary. 
31. Dennis (1984): 88 sq.; Mair (2007): 121, 123; Guo (ed.) (1962): 199 sq., 208.
32. Du (1988): 3823;Mair (2007): 120; Guo (ed.) (1962): 195.
33. Sidebottom (2004): 78.
34. Illinois Greek Club (1923): 429. There is considerable evidence that Greek armies 
of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE were reluctant to take action in the absence of 
favorable auspices; see Bowden (2005): 5 sq.
35. Polyaenus (1974): 67; other examples can be found on pages 59, 68 sq., 180 sq., and 
331. Also see Frontinus (1980): 75-79.
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Before leading his troops out of Luoyang to do battle with Li Mi in 618, 
Wang Shichong claimed that the Duke of Zhou, the ancient statesman who 
had founded that city more than fifteen hundred years earlier, had appeared to 
him in a dream. On this pretext, he established a shrine for the Duke by the 
bank of the Luo River and had shamans announce the Duke’s intention: If the 
soldiers went out to fight Li Mi they would certainly win great merit, but if 
they refused they would all die of a pestilence. 36 A Jin-dynasty general named 
Li Ju had made use of almost exactly the same device to nerve the defenders 
of Xingyang to make a surprise attack on a Xiongnu army in 317 CE, except 
that on that occasion the shamans claimed to be interpreting the will of Zichan, 
another ancient statesman who happened to be associated with the area around 
Xingyang. 37 In this regard, the Chinese – ancient and medieval – had more 
in common with Mediterranean antiquity than with the Byzantines, in whose 
armies Christian prayers and liturgies had supplanted the ancient omens and 
auspices. 38
One did not have to be a Christian to recognize the beneficial impact that 
solicitous treatment of the wounded and the dead might have on the morale of 
the troops and their willingness to fight. The ancient Chinese military literature 
included an anecdote telling how Wu Qi, a renowned general of the fifth century 
BCE, went so far as to suck the pus from his men’s abscesses in order to 
secure their loyalty and affection. 39 By the early Tang dynasty, this concern 
for the men was no longer personal but had been thoroughly bureaucratized. 
According to Li Jing,
“In all cases when there are invalids in the encampments, in each encampment 
designate one officer to inspect the thick soups and porridges being fed to them 
and to lead them when the army is on the march. A comprehensive report on 
those men who have just fallen ill and those who have been lost to sickness is 
made to the commander every morning, and a medical man is ordered to make 
the rounds of the encampment with medicine to cure the sick.” 40
36. This episode can be found in Wei Zheng et al. (1973): 1897, and Du (1988): 4016. A 
more complex and probably later version is in Ouyang, Song (1975): 3692, and Sima 
Guang (1956): 5809.
37. Fang Xuanling et al. (1974): 131, 1707.
38. For the role of religion in the Byzantine military, see Goubert (1947): 495-500.
39. This story can be found in the Shi ji biography of Wu Qi; see Sima Qian (1959): 42, 
translated in Nienhauser (ed.) (1995): 42.
40. Du (1988): 3819 sq.
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Although it might not be possible to provide an animal sacrifice and the 
ritually prescribed double coffin, the fallen were to receive a decent burial at 
the very least:
“If a man dies in enemy territory, the libation is made with a single cup of 
wine, the grave is four feet deep, and his commanding officer sends men to 
wail by the grave. For a man who dies in the interior and not in enemy territory, 
the sacrifice and wailing are as previously described but [the body] is sent to 
[the man’s registered] place of origin.” 41
The practical advantages to be gained from such observances, implicit in 
these passages from Li Jing, is made explicit in the Strategikon: “After battle 
the general should give prompt attention to the wounded and see to burying 
the dead. Not only is this a religious duty, but it greatly helps the morale of the 
living.” 42
Deadly ground: a point of disagreement
The Chinese and the Byzantines did not always see eye to eye, however, 
nor did they interpret their inherited traditions in quite the same way. One 
area where divergence is especially apparent is the set of related problems 
that the Chinese military classics labeled “deadly ground” (si di) and “the 
desperate bandit” (qiong kou). The basic idea, the psychological supposition 
underpinning the stratagem, is that troops who have been surrounded or have 
their backs to the wall with no hope of escape are especially dangerous foes 
because they will fight with a reckless courage born of desperation. Hence, 
the Sunzi bingfa maintains that “desperate bandits” should not be pressed; 
encircled enemies must be allowed a way out so they may choose to flee rather 
than fight. 43 Li Jing accepted the same logic in the early Tang: “If the enemy 
is in deadly ground, with no place to rely on to make himself secure, where 
his provisions are already used up, and relieving troops cannot reach him, he 
is called a ‘desperate bandit’… Deploy but do not accept battle – this is the 
method for defeating the enemy’s plan.” 44 Sunzi seems to have understood 
“deadly ground” in situational rather than geographical terms, but his second-
century CE commentator, the late-Han warlord Cao Cao, was happy to fill in 
the picture with concrete terrain features. “In front, there are high mountains; 
41. Du (1988): 3820.
42. Dennis (1984): 70; also see page 86.
43. Mair (2007): 104; Guo (ed.) (1962): 128-31.
44. Du (1988): 4087.
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behind, there is a great river. If one tries to advance, one cannot; if one tries to 
retreat there is an obstruction.” 45 The idea of giving a cornered enemy a way out 
is no less prominent in the classical Western tradition than in the Chinese; it is 
mentioned, in some cases repeatedly, by Frontinus, Onasander, Polyaenus, and 
Vegetius. Polyaenus tells us that the Spartan king Agesilaus, after his victory at 
Coronaea in 394 BCE, was told that the surviving Athenians had taken refuge 
in the temple of Athena. His reply? “‘Let them go wherever they are inclined; 
for nothing can be attended with greater danger, than an engagement to which 
the enemy is forced by despair.’” 46 According to Frontinus, “Scipio Africanus 
used to say that a road not only ought to be afforded to the enemy for flight, 
but that it ought even to be paved.” 47 The idea carried over seamlessly into the 
Byzantine tradition, appearing in the Strategikon, in the anonymous treatise 
now thought to have been written by Syrianos in the ninth century, and in the 
tenth-century treatise “On Skirmishing” written at the behest of Nikephoros 
Phokas. 48
A corollary of the stratagem of leaving the enemy a way out is to 
deliberately deploy one’s own army in a place of no escape in order to unlock 
the same sort of primal ferocity. This ploy is perhaps most fully articulated 
in Sunzi bingfa: “Throw your forces into positions from which there is no 
outlet; there they may die, but they will not be put to rout. Since they are 
ready for death, the officers and men will exert themselves to the utmost.” 49 
If one occupies “deadly ground,” one should fight – and can expect to do so 
with a psychological advantage. 50 The stratagem of placing one’s soldiers in a 
desperate situation – especially attractive if they were relatively poor soldiers – 
was employed repeatedly in Chinese history, most famously by Han Xin at the 
Jingxing Pass in 205 BC, when he deployed his inferior force with its back to a 
river to defeat a superior opponent occupying the heights above. 51 At the battle 
of Shayuan in 537, Yuwen Tai of the Western Wei deployed his much smaller 
army with its back against the Wei River and managed to defeat his Eastern 
Wei rival, Gao Huan. Although Li Jing neither mentions nor recommends this 
ploy in his “Military Methods,” it was used during his lifetime – most notably 
45. Guo (ed.) (1962): 185 sq.
46. Polyaenus (1974): 52; also see pages 57 and 101.
47. Frontinus (1980): 315; also see pages 165–169. For other mentions of the concept, see 
Milner (1993): 101, and Illinois Greek Club (1923): 497.
48. Dennis (1984): 81, 91; Dennis (1985): 107, 119, and 235.
49. Mair (2007): 119 sq.; Guo (ed.) (1962): 194.
50. Mair (2007): 105; also see pages 122, 124. Chinese text in Guo (ed.) (1962): 133, 204 
sq., 209.
51. Kierman (Kierman, Fairbank) (1974): 56-62.
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against Li Mi at the Mang Hills in the autumn of 618, when the victor, Wang 
Shichong, copied Han Xin’s playbook from Jingxing. 52
There is nothing uniquely Chinese about this idea. Numerous historical 
examples of battle plans based on the same psychological assumptions can 
be found in the Greek and Roman strategemata; here is one from Polyaenus: 
“Iphicrates having been brought to an engagement in an open plain, where 
the enemy were much superior in numbers, drew up his army; first opening a 
trench on his rear: thereby showing them, that by thus having cut off all hopes 
of retreat, they had nothing left but to conquer or die.” 53 Onasander, however, 
was less enthusiastic about this approach:
“Generals who destroy their own defenses or cross rivers or who post their 
armies with steep cliffs or yawning gulfs in their rear in order that the soldiers 
may either stand and conquer or in their desire to escape be killed, I am not 
wholly able to praise nor yet to blame, for everything that is ventured rashly is 
rather the part of recklessness than of wisdom, and has a greater share of luck 
than of good judgement.” 54
The Byzantines appear to have been even less interested in the exploitation 
of “deadly ground.” The deliberate positioning of soldiers in desperate 
situations is recommended in none of their surviving military treatises, and 
when, in their actual warfare, Byzantine armies fought from such positions 
it was not by choice. In the winter of 503-4, for example, an Eastern Roman 
army deployed with its back to the River Nymphius and defeated its Persian 
pursuers, but it chose to fight only because its retreat was blocked by the river. 55 
There is some evidence that in Byzantine eyes such ploys were associated with 
barbarians and were regarded as likely to rebound upon their users. According 
to the early seventh-century historian Theophylact Simocatta, before the battle 
of Solachon (in 586 or 587) the Persian commander ordered his men to destroy 
the skin flasks they had filled with water, to make it clear to them that they 
would either die of thirst or fight their way through the Byzantine battle line 
to drink from the River Arzamon. “Nor indeed did his boldness stand him in 
52. The battle of the Mang Hills is described in Sima Guang (1956): 5810 sq.; Wei Zheng 
et al. (1973): 1632 and 1897; and in Graff (1995): 289-317.
53. Polyaenus (1974): 104, with spelling modernized; also see pages 32, 57, 137, 196, 215, 
216, 242, and 301; and Frontinus (1980): 81.
54. Illinois Greek Club (1923): 475. The author really does go back and forth on this; 
two pages later he writes, “If the destruction of one’s army is evident, except through 
the use of some daring strategy, and if the destruction of the enemy by defeat is also 
evident, then I do not think a general would be at fault in cutting off the retreat of his 
own army.” (page 477)
55. Greatrex (1998): 110.
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good stead,” commented Theophylact, “for it is foolish, by trusting the dice 
of Fortune, to be confident at the heights of peril, and to glean favourable 
outcomes from previous errors.” In the event, the Persians were defeated and 
suffered horribly from lack of water during their subsequent retreat. 56
The Byzantine aversion to “deadly ground” stratagems probably owed as 
much to limited reserves of trained manpower and a reluctance to squander 
them in risky ventures as to religious beliefs and scruples. As the inheritor of 
the military traditions of the Principate, the Eastern Roman army of the sixth 
and seventh centuries was made up largely of men who were in theory, and to 
a considerable extent in practice as well, professional soldiers – professional in 
the sense that they enlisted for long periods of time, served for pay, and relied on 
soldiering as their main or even their sole source of income. 57 Such men were 
expensive, and they could not be easily replaced. Civilians were untrained and, 
in the interest of public order, not allowed to own weapons. Some weapons 
were stored in city armories so that the populace might assist in the defense 
in the event of a siege, but apart from this sort of special situation the Eastern 
Roman state appears never to have contemplated the short-term conscription of 
large numbers of civilians to meet even its most pressing military needs. 58 The 
Chinese, with their generally less “professional” armies, had access to vastly 
greater manpower resources from which to make good any losses. During the 
early years of the Tang dynasty for example, the court relied not only on the 
farmer-soldiers subordinated to several hundred local regimental headquarters 
(zhechong fu), a sort of “national guard” that may have included about 260,000 
men in the second quarter of the seventh century, but also on large numbers of 
men conscripted on an ad hoc basic for specific military campaigns. 59 In the 
context of China’s rather different military institutions, “deadly ground” ploys 
may have been attractive as a way of getting indifferently trained and poorly 
motivated conscripts to fight at all.
Conclusion
Despite such discrepancies, likely stemming from differences in material 
conditions and military institutions, the conventional wisdom about warfare 
56. Theophylact (1986): 49.
57. Ahrweiler (Parry, Yapp) (1975): 89.
58. Jones (1964): 1.671; Kaegi (1992): 37, 50, 52, 259 sq.
59. For a more extensive discussion of early Tang military institutions, see Graff (2002): 
189-192. The figure of 260,000 is drawn from Lai (1986): 12.
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in China and the Mediterranean world was for the most part quite similar. 
War was not to be welcomed, but had to be approached with care and caution. 
In the conduct of war, the emphasis was on rational planning and foresight 
rather than heroic bravado. Deception and trickery were prized rather than 
despised, as were any and all devices that might give one an advantage 
over one’s opponent. Although there were some prominent exceptions, the 
recommended style of generalship in both civilizations was notably unheroic, 
with generals directing battles from the rear rather then fighting in the front 
rank. 60 As the Strategikon puts it, “Superior officers should be stationed in safe 
places, so they do not dash forward and fall in battle, which would discourage 
the soldiers.” 61 The Weiliaozi, a Chinese military treatise probably dating 
from the third century BCE, includes a story about the great general Wu Qi 
refusing a sword offered him by his subordinates with the explanation, “To 
command the troops and direct their blades, this is the role of the commander. 
To wield a single sword is not his role.” 62 In both China and West, the hard-
earned lessons acquired from past experience were recorded in writing, handed 
down to later generations, and applied to the conduct of warfare. For the most 
part, these lessons pointed men in the same direction. As the example of the 
“deadly ground” ploy suggests, however, the efficacy of particular stratagems 
is by no means universal, but may instead be linked to social and institutional 
conditions that are themselves impermanent.
60. Two obvious exceptions are Alexander of Macedon and the second emperor of the 
Tang dynasty, Li Shimin (Tang Taizong). For Li Shimin’s behavior in battle, see Graff 
(Deist) (2003): 155-167.
61. Dennis (1984): 32.
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